



Assigning Papers to Referees

Objectives, Algorithms, Open Problems

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Overview



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- Motivation
- Informal Problem Definition
- Formal Definition
- Algorithms and Hardness
- Truthfulness

Slides and paper are available at my home page

I was program chair of ESA 2008.

After submission closes and before reviewing starts, the PC chair assigns the papers to the PC members (called reviewers in the sequel).

What constitutes a good assignment?

Informal Problem Definition I



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- n reviewers, r indexes reviewers
- m papers, p indexes papers
- v_{rp} , the **value** of paper p for reviewer r
the interest of reviewer r in paper p
the qualification of reviewer r for paper p
the **rank** of paper p for reviewer r
- valuations can be determined in many different ways:
 - the PC chair invents them
 - papers and reviewers provide key words, v_{rp} is a function of the number of common key words
 - reviewers provide values in $\{ \text{NO, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH} \}$
 - a combination of the above (our recommendation)
 - EasyChair (Andrei Voronkov), the system used for ESA 2008, asks the reviewers for bids

Informal Problem Definition II



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- n reviewers, r indexes reviewers m papers, p indexes papers
- edge-labelled bipartite graph $G = (\text{papers} \cup \text{reviewers}, E)$
- $(r, p) \notin E$ means that r cannot review p conflict of interest
- for $e = (r, p) \in E$, $v_{rp} \in \{1, \dots, \Delta\}$ is the rank of r for p
- an assignment M is a subset of the edges

Informal Problem Definition II



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- Objectives
 - **Coverage**: each paper is reviewed (at least) k times
 - **Load-Balance**: load is shared evenly among reviewers;
every rev. reviews $h = \lceil mk/n \rceil$ or $h - 1$ papers; today: $mk/n \in \mathbb{N}$

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 - **Quality**: papers are reviewed by qualified reviewers and reviewers get the papers that they are interested in
 - **Fairness**: papers are treated fairly, reviewers are treated fairly

Quality w.r.t. a Reviewer (Paper)



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- balanced assignment: k reviews per paper, h reviews per reviewer
- signature of reviewer r : $s^r = (s_\Delta^r, \dots, s_1^r)$
 $s_\ell^r =$ number of papers with valuation ℓ assigned to r

- order signatures either
 - lexicographically or
 - by weight

$$w(s^r) = \sum_{1 \leq \ell \leq \Delta} w_\ell s_\ell^r$$

where $w_\ell = \ell$ or $w_\ell = 2^\ell$ or ...

- reviewers prefer assignments that give them a high signature (selfish view)

EasyChair's Solution



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- convert the v_{rp} 's to numbers (LOW = 1, MEDIUM = 2, HIGH = 3)
- compute an maximum weight balanced assignment

EasyChair computes an approximation

- value of assignment = sum of the values of the reviewers

$$\sum_r w(s^r)$$

- LEDA running time: 0.1 sec for ESA instance
- maximum weight assignments are not necessarily “fair”


- four papers, two reviewers, each paper needs to be reviewed once
- reviewers agree in their valuation: two papers are H, two papers are L
- consider

Assignment A: reviewer 1: L L reviewer 2: H H

Assignment B: reviewer 1: L H reviewer 2: L H

- both assignments have weight $2w(H) + 2w(L)$, but **Assignment B is more fair than Assignment A**
- **whenever valuation v_{rp} depends only on p , all assignments have the same weight**

Max Weight Assignment



Formalization of Fairness



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- PC work is a group effort; therefore special attention should be given to the reviewer that is least satisfied by an assignment
- recall $s^r(M)$ = signature of reviewer r in assignment M
- signatures are ordered (lexicographically or by weight)
- for an assignment M

$$\min_r s^r(M)$$

is the worst signature of any reviewer r

- we want the balanced assignment that maximizes the minimum signature

$$\max_M \min_r s^r(M)$$

- and among these assignments?
- the one that maximizes the second smallest signature, and among these, the one ... **leximax solution**

Results

$\Delta \geq 3$: problem is NP-complete

all Δ : approx. such that every reviewer loses at most Δ wrt optimum

$\Delta = 2$: efficient algorithm

experiments: good solutions for ESA data

Signatures are Ordered by Weight



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- inspired by allocation of indivisible goods (Santa Claus problem)
- sources
 - Bezakova, Dani: ACM SIGecom 2005
 - Lenstra, Schmoys, Tardos: Math Program. 1990
- the values v_{rp} are numbers and it makes sense to add them
- binary variables x_{rp} with $x_{rp} = 1$ iff paper p is assigned to reviewer r
- load and coverage constraints:
 - $\sum_p x_{rp} = h$ for every reviewer r
 - $\sum_r x_{rp} = k$ for every (real) paper p

$S_r := \sum_p v_{rp} x_{rp}$ is value (utility) for reviewer r

A Hardness Result



- goal: maximize the smallest signature
- It is NP-hard to compute a balanced assignment approximating the minimum signature within less than $\Delta/2$ for all $\Delta \geq 3$

An Approximation Result



- fractional balanced assignments
 - every fractional balanced assignment gives rise to a vector (t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n) , where $t_i =$ utility for reviewer i
 - let $(t_1^*, t_2^*, \dots, t_n^*)$ be an optimal fractional assignment, i.e., it maximizes $sort(t_1^*, \dots, t_n^*)$ (sort in increasing order)
 - $(t_1^*, t_2^*, \dots, t_n^*)$ is unique and efficiently computable
- fractional assignment: we may assign papers fractionally, e.g., 0.3 to reviewer 1, 0.5 to reviewer 2, 0.2 to reviewer 3.

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 - $(t_1^*, t_2^*, \dots, t_n^*)$ is unique and efficiently computable
- in polynomial time one can compute an integral assignment M such that

$$S_r > t_r^* - \Delta \quad \text{for all } r$$

i.e., each reviewer is within Δ of its utility in optimal fractional assignment

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- approach: compute optimal fractional assignment and round

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- remark: ESA instance ($\Delta = 3$): $h = 58$ and $58 \leq S_r \leq 174$, but
 $k = 4$ and $4 \leq S_p \leq 12$

Finding the Optimum Fractional Solution



- proceed in rounds: in j -th round we compute j -th entry of $(s_1^*, \dots, s_n^*) := \text{sort}(t_1^*, \dots, t_n^*)$
- assume that we know the first $j - 1$ entries of s^* and the reviewers r_1 to r_{j-1} defining them
- consider the following LP: maximize q subj. to
 - x guarantees coverage and load balance
 - $\sum_p v_{rip} x_{rip} = s_i^*$ for $1 \leq i < j$
 - $\sum_p v_{rp} x_{rp} \geq q$ for the remaining r
- let q^* be the optimal value.
- find the reviewer(s) that cannot do better than q^*
change one of the $\geq q$ into a $> q$ and check feasibility
- set s_j^* to q^* and r_j to this reviewer

Rounding Fractional Solutions



- let $x(e)$, $e \in E$ be any fractional solution satisfying the load and coverage constraints
- let $s_r(x) := \sum_p v_{rp} x_{rp}$, value for reviewer r
- let $s_p(x) := \sum_r v_{rp} x_{rp}$, value for paper p
- in polynomial time, we can find an integer assignment $y(e)$, $e \in E$, such that
 - y satisfies the load and coverage constraints
 - $s_r(y) > s_r(x) - \Delta$ for all reviewers r
 - $s_p(y) > s_p(x) - \Delta$ for all papers p .
- observe that we have a guarantee for reviewers and papers

The Rounding Scheme




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- given a fractional assignment $x(e)$, $e \in E$ round to $y(e) \in \{0, 1\}$

The Rounding Scheme




- given a fractional assignment $x(e)$, $e \in E$ round to $y(e) \in \{0, 1\}$
- consider a fixed reviewer r , order the incident edges in order of decreasing weight, say $w(e_1^r) \geq w(e_2^r) \geq \dots$
- visualize the values $x(e_1^r)$, $x(e_2^r)$, \dots



The Rounding Scheme



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
- goal: at least one of $y(e_1^r), y(e_2^r)$ is one,
at least two of $y(e_1^r), \dots, y(e_4^r)$ are one, ...
- more generally: $x(e_1^r) + \dots + x(e_\ell^r) \geq j \Rightarrow y(e_1^r) + \dots + y(e_\ell^r) \geq j$
- such an integral solution exists and it yields the desired approximation

The Approximation Quality



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- given a fractional solution $x(e)$, $e \in E$, round to $y(e) \in \{0, 1\}$
- reviewer r , order incident edges by weight $w(e_1^r) \geq w(e_2^r) \geq \dots$
- assume: $x(e_1^r) + \dots + x(e_\ell^r) \geq j \Rightarrow y(e_1^r) + \dots + y(e_\ell^r) \geq j$




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- how much can we loose by rounding? **No more than**


$$(w(e_1^r) - w(e_2^r)) + (w(e_2^r) - w(e_4^r)) + \dots$$

since fractional value of $[1, 2]$ at most $w(e_2^r)$ and integral value at least $w(e_4^r)$

The Approximation Quality



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
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
- this telescopes to no more than Δ

Existence: A Flowproblem




- have h nodes for each reviewer (supply one) and k nodes for each paper (demand one)
- $e_4^r = r_p$ belongs to second and third group with respect to r and first and second group with respect to p .
- fractional flow is feasible
- all capacities are integral \Rightarrow integral flow exists
- flow out of $\{r_1, \dots, r_i\}$ is at least i , flow into $\{p_1, \dots, p_j\}$ is at least j .

Max Weight Assignment



Our Assignment (leximax)



Two Ranks



- ordering signatures by weight or lexicographically is the same
- consider (reviewers are ordered by signature)

H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	L	L	L
H	H	H	H	H	H	L	L	L	L	L
H	H	H	H	H	H	L	L	L	L	L
H	H	H	H	H	L	L	L	L	L	L
H	H	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L

- we want the assignment for which the **H — L – staircase** is as far to the right as possible
- this is the same as saying that the H — L – staircase is as far down as possible.
- we will next see a polynomial time alg for the case of two ranks

A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Two Ranks



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- the following alg computes an assignment for any value of Δ
for $\Delta = 2$, it computes leximax solution
for $\Delta \geq 3$, it also seems to work well
- ranks are in $\{1, \dots, \Delta\}$, large ranks are better than small ranks
- we view the assignment as proceeding in rounds:

revs	papers					revs	ranks (sorted)				
1	3	7	4	9	1	1	5	5	3	1	1
2	5	4	2	3	7	2	5	4	2	2	2
3	3	1	4	7	9	3	3	1	1	1	1

- signature of a round:
(# of rank Δ papers, # of rank $\Delta - 1$ papers, \dots , # of rank 1 papers)

Rank-Maximality



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
- we view the assignment as proceeding in rounds:
- signature of a round:
(# of rank Δ papers, # of rank $\Delta - 1$ papers, \dots , # of rank 1 papers)
- objective:
 - maximize signature of first round and subject to this signature of second round and \dots
 - for two ranks: objective yields lex-max solution
 - for more than two ranks: ????
- polynomial time algorithm via
 - weighted bipartite matching problem with exponentially large weights
 - running time, 1 sec for ESA instance

The Weighted Bipartite Matching Problem



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- vertex r_ℓ represents reviewer r in round ℓ , $1 \leq \ell \leq h$
- vertex p_c represents copy c of paper p , $1 \leq c \leq k$
- for an edge $e = (r, p)$ of rank d , we have vertices (e, R) and (e, P) and the edges shown



- If p is assigned to r in round ℓ , $(r_\ell, (e, R))$ and $((e, P), p_c)$ are in M .
- If p is not assigned to r in any round, $((e, R), (e, P)) \in M$.
- the edges from nodes r_ℓ to the nodes (e, R) are weighted

The Weights




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- if $e = (r, p)$ has rank d , we give the edge connecting r_ℓ and (e, R) weight


$$(n + 1)^d W^{k-\ell+1} \quad \text{where } W = (n + 1)^{r+1}$$

- weights for a single round:
 - a paper of rank d contributes weight $(n + 1)^d$ to the weight of a round; because then
 - n rank $d - 1$ assignments cannot make up for one rank d assignment
 - maximum weight of a round: $n(n + 1)^r$, set $W = (n + 1)^{r+1}$
- total weight of assignment = $w_1 W^k + w_2 W^{k-1} + \dots + w_k W^0$
 $w_\ell =$ weight of round ℓ and k is the number of rounds

Max Weight Assignment



Our Assignment (rank-maximal)



first 22 rounds are perfect

Truthfulness



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- the goal of a reviewer is to maximize his signature

does any of the strategies induce reviewers to reveal their true valuations?

Truthfulness



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does any of the strategies induce reviewers to reveal their true valuations?

- NO
 - assume we have three reviewers, three papers and each paper needs to be reviewed twice.
 - the reviewers have equal valuations: they rate papers 1 and 2 high and paper 3 medium.
 - assume reviewers 2 and 3 tell the truth; then
 - reviewer 1 should lie about paper 3 and state a low rating.
 - he will get papers 1 and 2.

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- more extreme: a reviewer declares a conflict for all but h papers

What Next?



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- are these the right objectives; alternative objectives?
- more algorithms (exact and approximate)
- a deeper investigation of truthfulness
- a better way to determine valuations?
bids + keywords + wisdom of PC chair
- more experiments in collaboration with Andrei Voronkov (EasyChair)
- incorporation into EasyChair